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GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY:
CONTROLLING THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD SUPPLY IN THE
AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
Debra M. Strauss* and Melanie C. Strauss**

I.

INTRODUCTION

With globalization and widespread technological advances, new
international issues have emerged that hold critical importance for transnational
economic integration, state sovereignty, and the future of global governance. These
issues notably affect the power, authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy of states as
defined in the Westphalian system.1 Overall, the controversy over genetically
engineered foods follows the trend that “while states were once the masters over
markets, now it is the markets which, on many critical issues, are the masters over
the governments.”2 The resolutions of trade disputes and international conflicts over
genetically modified (GM) foods have taken away from state sovereignty—the
ability for each state to make laws to regulate and control its domestic food supply—
by favoring free trade and universal standards. Nation-states are no longer the only
players in this arena, because international agencies, transnational biotechnology
corporations, and non-governmental organizations have significant powers and roles
in the decision-making process of regulating GM foods on the nation-state and
international levels.
The ongoing controversy over the production, international trade, and
management of GM foods is demonstrated in the 2006 decision by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to preclude the European Union (EU) from maintaining a de
facto ban of GM food imports. Part II of this article will provide a background on
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), their potential benefits, and their uncertain
risks. Part III analyzes the U.S.-EU trade dispute, and how the WTO’s decision
potentially increases the future likelihood of global governance and decreases the
significance of state borders, while still allowing states to have some control of their
domestic regulatory processes. Part IV presents the contrary perspective, that
Copyright © 2009, Debra M. Strauss and Melanie C. Strauss.
*
Assistant Professor of Business Law, Charles F. Dolan School of Business, Fairfield University; B.A.,
Cornell University; J.D., Yale Law School. Professor Strauss, a former Food and Drug Law Institute
Scholar, currently teaches the legal environment of business, international law, and law and ethics.
**
B.S. Candidate 2010, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
1
“Westphalian system” is term that dates back to the Westphalia peace treaty of 1648 and is generally
used to describe the current system of nation-states with territorial integrity and national sovereignty. See,
e.g., Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG.
251, 251 (2001) (discussing its traditional origins and questioning whether the world is moving “beyond
Westphalia” and the “pillars of the Westphalian temple decaying”); Benno Teschke, Theorizing the
Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism, 8 EUR. J. INT’L REL.
5 (2002) (presenting a “new approach, revolving around contested property relations, for theorizing the
constitution, operation and transformation of geopolitical systems, exemplified with reference to early
modern international relations”).
2
Susan Strange, The Declining Authority of States, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 127, 128
(2d. ed. 2003).
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implementing more international regulations on domestic issues, for purposes such
as food security and safety, detracts significantly from state sovereignty, limiting the
abilities of nation-states to act in the best interests of their citizens, follow their
cultural norms, or adhere to previously established international agreements. This
position holds that because genetically modified products are not purely international
trade issues, global governance is not necessary and policies should be determined
by states. As Part V concludes, the GMOs debate evokes the central conflict
between free markets and international economic integration versus state regulation
and economic protectionism. Its resolution will, accordingly, carry implications
beyond the area of global food safety and sustainability to the ultimate
transformation of the international political economy.

II.

BACKGROUND ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS

Genetically modified foods are created when genetic materials are altered
using technological processes, such as recombinant DNA, that combine molecules
from different DNA sources into single molecules.3 This technological process,
available since 1995, can manipulate foods to create new plant varieties with unique
benefits, including resistance to pesticides, toxicity to predatory insects, or enhanced
nutritional contents.4 Other potential benefits of GM foods include increased
agricultural productivity, reduced chemical usage, improved food sustainability and
quality, and the reduction of world hunger.5 Additionally, GM foods increase the
ability to grow crops in areas with harsh agricultural and environmental conditions.
Today, the most common GM food crops are soybeans, cotton, and canola, such as
herbicide-resistant cotton created by inserting herbicide resistant genes into the
plant.6
However, there are unknown and potentially hazardous impacts of GM
foods on human health, food safety, and the environment. GMOs could influence
health by affecting the allergenicity, toxicity, and nutrition contents in food. GM
foods may also harm the environment through cross-pollination, damaging
3

For more background information on this technology, including the health and environmental risks, see
Debra M. Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Importing Caution
into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 167 (2006) [hereinafter Strauss, Importing
Caution].
4
Charlotte Granville-West, et al., Special report 2: The WTO and EU policy towards GMOs, EUR. POL’Y
ANALYST 47 (2006).
5
World Health Organization (WHO), Modern Food Biotechnology, Human Health and Development: an
Evidence-Based Study, at iii (June 24, 2005) [hereinafter WHO STUDY], available at
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/biotech_en.pdf. But see Debra M. Strauss, Defying
Nature: The Ethical Implications of Genetically Modified Plants, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 7–19 (2007)
(debunking the myths that this technology would reduce world hunger, decrease pesticide usage, improve
nutritional content, and increase farmers’ income and contrasting these claims of potential benefits with
the risks) [hereinafter Strauss, Ethical Implications].
6
Laylah Zurek, Comment, The European Communities Biotech Dispute: How the WTO Fails to Consider
Cultural Factors in the Genetically Modified Food Debate, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 345, 348 (2007).
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ecosystem biodiversity, and harming traditional agriculture methods.7 There are
fears that multinational biotech companies could crowd out local seed markets and
farmers, or that the spread of genetically modified material could lead to the
development of hybrid superweeds or superpests that are highly resistant to
pesticides.8 Currently, there is inconclusive information on the negative effects of
GM foods; additional research and risk assessments should be conducted to explore
future consequences of manipulating genes in crops.
Globalization has helped shaped the rise of the agricultural biotechnology
industry. When globalization is viewed as a permanent and structural change, it is
clear that the recent agricultural technological advances impact trade and the
meaning of space, because it is no longer feasible for states to engage in economic
protectionism and new technologies are changing how people view traditional food.
The increased internationalization of the seed industry and company mergers in the
1990s has led to the development of expansive and powerful multinational
corporations with sufficient capital funding for research and development.9
Increased mechanization has heightened agricultural productivity and the demand for
capital funding of new biotechnology projects.10 The production of goods is
international, rather than state-based, and technological innovation leads to mass
consumption and value-added manufactured goods.11

7

WHO STUDY, supra note 5, at 12, 20. See also Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), Biotechnology in Food and Agriculture, FAO Statement on Biotechnology,
http://www.fao.org/biotech/stat.asp?lang=en (last visited June 16, 2009) (recognizing the potential risks to
human and animal health and environmental consequences, and recommending a cautious approach,
including post-approval monitoring and “a science-based evaluation system that would objectively
determine the benefits and risks of each individual GMO. This calls for a cautious case-by-case approach
to address legitimate concerns for the biosafety of each product or process prior to its release”).
8
See Starla L. Borg, Note, Waiting for the River: The United States and European Union, Heads Up and
High Stakes in the WTO—Genetically Modified Organisms in International Trade, 43 WASHBURN L.J.
681, 704 (2004) (describing the backdrop of the dispute in an analogy to a game of poker and predicting a
loss for the EU).
9
Marc Williams, Feeding the World?: Transnational Corporations and the Promotion of Genetically
Modified Food, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th
Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb. 28, 2007,
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p179775_index.html>, at 4; see also William Lesser, Intellectual
Property Rights and Concentration in Agricultural Biotechnology, 1 AGBIOFORUM 56 (1998).
10
See Williams, supra note 9, at 6.
11
According to the ETC Group’s 2005 report on the seed industry, “corporate concentration—not only in
food and agriculture, but in all sectors related to the products and processes of life—has increased
remarkably” so that the top 10 companies control almost half of the $21 billion commercial seed market.
The internationalization of corporate control is dramatically evident in the 2005 figures: “Since ETC’s
2003 report, the world’s top 10 seed companies have increased their control from one-third to one-half of
the global seed trade and the top 10 biotech enterprises have raised their share from just over half to nearly
three-quarters of world sales in that sector.” ETC Group, Globalization Inc. Communiqué #91, Oligopoly
Inc: Concentration in Corporate Power, 2005 (2005), at 2, available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pub_id=44. In addition, the top 10 publiclytraded biotech companies accounted for almost three-quarters of the global biotech market. Id. at 1.
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The United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Canada are the largest producers
of GM foods;12 not surprisingly, then, they support biotechnology companies and the
free trade of GMOs. In the United States as of 2008, 92 percent of soybeans acres,
86 percent of cotton acres, and 80 percent of corn acres were genetically engineered
to control weeds and insects. 13 As a result, most food products in U.S. stores contain
GMOs, without being labeled as a GM product.14 Biotech and agricultural
companies such as Monsanto are reaping huge profits because the United States does
not distinguish between GM and non-GM foods in its regulatory treatment;
moreover, the government grants patents to genetically engineered technological
processes, thereby increasing the incentive for companies to innovate.15 The
European Union, Japan, and Australia take cautionary stances that favor food
labeling and thorough health and safety testing before allowing GM foods to enter
their domestic food supplies. Particularly in the EU, consumers are concerned about
the safety of GM foods and prefer increased transparency, labeling, and
restrictions.16 In view of these differences in governmental regulations and public
opinion across nation-states, one must consider whether international organizations
should work to develop international policies that set standards and define global
regulations for the international trade of GM foods.

III.

INCREASED FREE TRADE ENHANCES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

With international trade as paramount, the interests of biotechnology
companies and the governments that support them reign supreme, even outweighing
at times the boundaries of nation-states. From this perspective, this section will
discuss in turn the context of the U.S.-EU GMO trade dispute, its implications for the
shift towards global governance, and the power of states to respond.
A. The U.S.-EU GMO Trade Dispute
The Codex Alimentarius Commission develops food standards based on
scientific studies and qualified expert opinions. The Codex then shares this
information with state governments, lawmakers, and international organizations such
as the WTO, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture
12

KATHRYN MCCONNELL, U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, WORLD TRADE AGENCY UPHOLDS
CHALLENGE OF EUROPEAN BIOTECH BAN, Sept. 29, 2006,
http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=BFD0D73C-E01B-478C-A164-08F5E747FEEF.
13
USDA Economic Research Service, Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/ (last visited June 9, 2009).
14
The Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) estimates that 75% of all processed foods in the United
States contain a GM ingredient, including almost every product with a corn or soy ingredient and some
containing canola or cottonseed oil. See Americans Clueless About Gene-Altered Foods (Mar. 23, 2005),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7277844/ (statement of Stephanie Childs, Grocery Manufacturers of
America).
15
USDA Economic Research Service, supra note 13.
16
See Zurek, supra note 6, at 361.
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Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Over 165 member states directly support
Codex, and its main goals are to protect consumer health while also promoting fair
food trade practices.17 The WTO’s mission is to promote free trade and economic
growth; thus, the 153 member-states adopting imported food standards beyond
Codex Alimentarius’ minimal national food safety standards must have scientific
evidence that the imported goods significantly threaten health or safety, rather than
merely harming domestic profits or jobs.18 Member states of the WTO can file
complaints to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the WTO’s panel of trade experts,
if they believe a member state has food trade policies that support state economic
protectionism. The WTO will then make an enforceable decision on whether the
specific issue or policy does hinder free trade, and member-states may have to
change their protectionist trade policies within a specified reasonable period of time.
In the domain of the international trade of food, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Agreement (SPS Agreement) acknowledges that states can protect
domestic food supplies for scientific, well-documented health and safety risks, as
long as this does not unfairly discriminate against a particular industry or country for
unfounded reasons.19 According to this agreement, instead of banning all products, a
state could implement less costly or less restrictive alternatives, such as mandatory
labeling or quality testing, to sustain free trade while protecting its citizens.20
In 2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina filed a case with the
WTO that claimed the European Commission (EC), and in particular six EU member
states, were intentionally slow in approving GM imports on a case-by-case basis, and
that this “undue delay” in the approval process was effectively a de facto ban of GM
products in the EU since 1998.21 Although the EU approved one strain of genetically
engineered corn in 2004, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Luxemburg
nonetheless banned GM crops, even though they were approved by other EU states.22
The moratorium cost U.S. corn producers approximately $300 million in annual
export sales and $5.5 billion in total sales for the global biotech market.23 The
17

Diahanna L. Post, The Precautionary Principle and Risk Assessment in International Food Safety: How
the World Trade Organization Influences Standards, 26 RISK ANALYSIS: AN INT’L J. 1259, 1262 (2006).
18
J. MARTIN ROCHESTER, BETWEEN PERIL AND PROMISE: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110
(2006).
19
Granville-West, supra note 4, at 51. See WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary
Measures
(SPS
Agreement)
(1994),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. For more on this
treaty, see RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 333-335
(6th ed. 2005).
20
See Borg, supra note 8, at 692.
21
Granville-West, supra note 4, at 47; see also Biotechnology Industry Organization, European Union
Moratorium, http://www.bio.org/foodag/background/eumoratorium.asp (last visited June 12, 2009); Press
Release, European Union, European Commission Regrets U.S. Decision to File WTO Case on GMOs as
Misguided and Unnecessary (May 23, 2003), http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2003/2003036.htm.
22
Borg, supra note 8, at 684.
23
CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE U.S.-EU DISPUTE (CRS Rep.
RS21556)
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United States, Canada, and Argentina also claimed that the EU’s policies would
harm worldwide agricultural exports, impede the development of advanced
agricultural biotechnology, and increase negative public perceptions of GM foods.
For example, even though there was a horrific famine in 2002 in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Zambia refused genetically modified corn given as foreign aid by the United States
because of environmental and food safety concerns, and the negative public
perceptions about GMOs due to the EU’s moratorium.24
From the U.S. perspective, resistance to GM foods “is fed by a potent
mixture of scientific irrationalism, economic protectionism, and even anti-U.S.
sentiment.”25 The United States, Canada, and Argentina asserted that decisions
against GM foods violated the SPS Agreement due to a lack of comprehensive
scientific evidence.26 They also claimed the moratorium violated other established
WTO treaties, including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement) that ensures that international regulatory standards do not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade, as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) that promotes free trade and tariff reductions.27
The international differences in approaches towards GM foods are reflected
in differences in regulatory schemes.28 The United States treats GM foods the same
as their conventional counterparts, opting not to require additional regulation or
labeling.29 In contrast, the EU favors close regulations for new technologies with
(March 10, 2006), at 1 [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
24
Jennifer Clapp, The Political Economy of Food Aid in an Era of Agricultural Biotechnology, 11
GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 467 (2005).
25
Robert Falkner, The Global Biotech Food Fight: Why the United States Got It So Wrong, 14 BROWN J.
WORLD AFF. 99, 100 (2007).
26
Complaints by the United States (WT/DS291), Canada (WT/DS292), and Argentina (WT/DS293).
27
Zurek, supra note 6, at 352 n. 50, 353. See WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement) (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm; General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
28
For a discussion of the differing regulatory approaches of the United States and the EU as a reflection of
the cultural views of risk and scientific uncertainty with the potential impact on international trade, see
Debra M. Strauss, Genetically Modified Organisms in Food: A Model of Labeling and Monitoring With
Positive Implications for International Trade, 40 INT’L LAW. 95 (2006).
29
Under the U.S. scheme, no special regulations have been developed for genetically modified food
because there is no recognition of risks inherent in the new technology:
The United States uses health and safety laws written prior to the advent of modern biotechnology to
review genetically engineered products. To date, the United States has not issued any new legislation for
these products . . . agencies that were responsible for regulatory oversight of certain product categories or
for certain product uses are also responsible for evaluating those same kinds of products developed using
genetic engineering.
United States Regulatory Agencies Unified Biotechnology Website, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov/FAQRecord.asp?qryGUID=2 (last visited June 11, 2009). For a compilation
of the laws currently used to regulate the products of modern biotechnology and the regulations developed
under these statutes (the Plant Protection Act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act), see United
States Regulatory Agencies Unified Biotechnology Website, U.S. Laws and Regulations,
http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov/lawsregsguidance.asp (last visited June 11, 2009); see also 1986 Coordinated
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uncertain implications, adhering to the precautionary principle in the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, an international agreement established to protect biological
diversity from the risks of biotechnology.30 The precautionary principle advocates a
cautionary approach so that insufficient or inconclusive scientific evidence on GM
foods should lead to regulation or prohibition until further information satisfies
safety concerns.31 As a result, the EU has strict labeling and traceability regulations
for GM foods and EU consumers vocally disapprove of GMOs.32 The EU claimed
that the contested bans addressed both environmental and health risk factors, so that
GM food imports could be banned under the SPS Agreement.33 The European
Commission also has argued that the de facto ban on GM foods was based upon
some scientific knowledge about probable risks associated with these crops.34
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986).
30
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, art. 1,
available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol]. The Cartagena Protocol was
put forth in January 2000 and went into effect on September 11, 2003, the ninetieth day after receiving the
fifty instruments of ratification by states or regional economic integration organizations that are parties to
the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and has
been ratified by191 parties. See IISD Linkages, A Brief Introduction to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/cbdintro.html (last updated Feb. 18, 2000). As of June 2009, 156
parties had ratified the Protocol. The United States, which had signed the CBD, but had not ratified it, is
not among them. Canada and Argentina had signed the Protocol but did not ratify it. For a list of the
status of the ratifying parties, see The Convention on Biological Diversity, List of Parties,
http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list.shtml (last visited June 11, 2009).
31
See CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 4.
32
For example, Directive 2001/18/EC sets forth measures for assessing human health and environmental
risks before any GM product can be released into the environment or marketed. Most significantly, this
Directive allows a temporary ban of GM products if evidence can be provided exposing risks to human
health or the environment. Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L106). See Strauss, Importing
Caution, supra note 3, at 176–81; see also Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 of the European Parliament
and Council on the Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms and Regulation (EC)
No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and Council on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 OJ
(L268), 24 & 25; European Commission, Questions and Answers on the Regulation of GMOs in the
European Community, http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/gmfood/qanda_en.pdf (last visited
June 11, 2009).
33
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, supra note 19, states that ‘‘[m]embers shall ensure that their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human,
animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations.’’ See Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S.
Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 794 (2008) (analyzing
this decision and its implications in detail) [hereinafter Strauss, Impact of the WTO].
34
Moreover, the EU member states sought to rely upon Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, supra note 19,
which provides an exception to the risk assessment requirement:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international
organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances,
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review
the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
The WTO Panel rejected their argument that a risk assessment could not be performed due to insufficient
scientific evidence, relying on the fact that the EU had itself performed such an assessment. The Panel’s
reasoning “misunderstands the very nature of scientific uncertainty that led to the EC legislation
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Despite these regulatory differences, in May 2006 the WTO made a ruling
against the EU and its individual member states in several respects.35 Although the
EU had legitimate concerns about the scientific uncertainties of GM foods, the WTO
ultimately decided it had implemented protectionist policies that were not based on
conclusive scientific research and detailed risk assessments, and thereby not covered
under the SPS Agreement.36 The WTO distinguished between state regulations that
address harms, and those designed for discriminatory purposes to “protect local
industries from the effects of global competition or to achieve other competitive
advantages in contravention of trade agreements.”37 Most significantly, the WTO’s
decision diverged from the internationally accepted precautionary principle of the
Cartagena Protocol, which asserts that countries can ban biotechnology products if
there is significant scientific uncertainty.38
It is important to note that the WTO has reached similar decisions
promoting free trade over scientific uncertainty in the past. In 1996, the United
States and Canada filed a complaint with the DSB against the EU’s ban of beef
imports containing any growth hormones on the grounds that the ban violated the
SPS Agreement.39 Although the EU contended the hormones were a potential
consumer health risk, the WTO overruled the EU’s ban as a violation of the SPS
Agreement. The ban lacked scientific certainty, was not in line with Codex’s
international standards, and was not supported by a thorough risk assessment.40
Instead, the WTO suggested that the EU was relying on social value judgments and

authorizing these provisional measures.” See Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 33, at 794-96.
WTO, Reports of the Panel, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing
of Biotech Products, WT/DS291, WT/DS292, and WT/DS293 (Sept. 29, 2006); Strauss, Impact of the
WTO, supra note 33, at 790-803 (discussing details of the ruling); see also WTO, Summary of the Dispute
to Date, DS291, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm (last visited June 12,
2009);
WTO,
Summary
of
the
Dispute
to
Date,
DS292,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds292_e.htm (last visited June 12, 2009); WTO,
Dispute Settlement, DS293, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds293_e.htm (last
visited June 12, 2009).
36
Granville-West, supra note 4, at 47.
37
Edward A. Morse, Sound Science and Trade Barriers: Democracy, Autonomy, and the Limits of the
SPS Agreement 1 (2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=982626>.
38
See ROCHESTER, supra note 18, at 110.
39
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999).
40
Justin J. Kastner & Rosa K. Pawsey, Harmonizing Sanitary Measures and Resolving Trade Disputes
through the WTO-SPS Framework, 13 FOOD CONTROL 49, 51 (2002). See Appellate Body Report, EC
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (Feb. 13, 1998), WT/DS26/AB/R;
WT/DS48/AB/R (stating that, although Article 5.7 may reflect a precautionary approach, “the principle
has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise
inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in particular provisions of that Agreement”); see also
Patrick J. Vallely, Tension Between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO: The Significance of Recent
WTO Developments in an Ongoing Debate, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 369 (2004) (analyzing the recent Appellate
Body decision against Japan concerning import restrictions on apples, including its impact on the conflicts
between the Protocol and the SPS Agreement).
35
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cultural norms that opposed meat with residues of growth hormones. Although
controversial, the implementation of this decision will, in theory, lead to more
international regulatory harmonization and free trade.41
B. The Shift Towards Global Governance
As detailed in the previous section, the WTO’s decision favoring free trade
of GMOs over technological precautions has key implications for the future of
globalization, the role of markets, and the possibility of global governance. Overall,
the ruling determines “how food safety, public health, and environmental health
measures should be applied to international trade.”42 Arguably, the decision will
open up the world economy to the potential benefits of GM foods and increase
international trade levels, through the flows of GM goods and capital for funding
biotechnological processes. The move towards free trade is consistent with today’s
increased globalization, international trade, and the mobility of goods, capital, and
technologies that have fundamentally changed our international political economy.
The WTO did not take a stance on the scientific implications, health, or
safety of GM foods, and it did not look at labeling and monitoring requirements;
rather, it only reached a decision about free trade policies.43 Extension of the
decision could imply that the trade and regulations of GM foods are international
issues subject to international regulatory bodies, such as the WTO and the WHO, as
well as international standards such as those promulgated by the Codex Commission.
Through the WTO’s decision, Codex is further legitimized as an international
organization with power and responsibility to make key decisions about food safety.
The WTO’s decision also expanded upon international norms by decisively going
against the precautionary principle in application to the free trade of GMOs.44 In this
respect, each nation-state does not have the right to implement barriers to trade, but
states can still make decisions on some domestic issues, such as how GM foods are
labeled and monitored once they are imported. According to Thomas Friedman, this

41
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U.S. issued retaliatory sanctions. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Approves U.S.,
Canada Sanctions on EU of $ 124.5 Million in Beef Hormone Dispute, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. 1158, 1158
(1999) (depicting the WTO approval of trade sanctions imposed upon the EC by the United States and
Canada because of the EC’s refusal to remove the import ban on hormone treated beef); Daniel Wüger,
The Never-Ending Story: The Implementation Phase in the Dispute Between the EC and the United States
on Hormone-Treated Beef, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 777, 804 (2002) (observing that some “see the
whole dispute settlement system and the WTO as endangered if the example provided by the EC is
followed by other countries because the advantage the WTO offers, i.e., the binding settlement of trade
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Global Implications of Genetically-Modified Organisms: Law, Ethics & Science: The WTO Biotechnology
Dispute, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 445, 462–63 (2003/2004) (noting that the DSU offers no alternative to
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is the “golden straightjacket” because states must remove import restrictions and
become more open to biotechnology.45 Other countries beyond the EU will be less
likely to ban GMOs or place restrictive labeling standards on GM foods, given the
WTO’s decision.46 Proponents of biotechnology claim that, particularly in
developing countries, GMOs could help solve other global issues, such as world
poverty and hunger, by improving food supplies, nutritional values, and agricultural
conditions, but many of these claims have proven to be unfounded.47
Because genetic engineering is a new technology, there are still
uncertainties as to where GMOs will fit within the international regulatory
framework. Perhaps the WTO is not the proper organization to make decisions on
the safety, security, and scientific uncertainties of GM foods. The WHO or the FAO
could potentially be more appropriate bodies, because they take scientific evidence
into consideration when determining international policies. While in the United
States the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determines both food policy and
science, in the EU these tasks are split between the European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA) for scientific evidence and the European Commission for determining
matters of policy.48 If one of the existing international organizations is not
appropriate, responsibility for GM foods could span multiple international bodies
each with specific spheres of authority, or a new transnational regulatory agency
could be created as a scientific and policy-making entity to focus more specifically
on the global food supply.49
In the future, perhaps similar rulings by the WTO and other international
regulatory agencies will increase the level of free trade and global governance in the
45
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domain of food safety, security, and biotechnology. With increased harmonization
of GM food regulations across countries and an emphasis on multilateralism,
countries will be more likely to come together to create one international body or
agency with the ultimate authority in this domain. Increased global governance
could improve international cooperation in discovering new applications of
biotechnology and using GM foods to solve global poverty and hunger. Also, state
borders and the specific country origins of GM foods could become less meaningful
because of the interconnectivity of GM food products. As a result, the WTO’s
decision could be viewed as a step forward in sustaining globalization, international
cooperation, regulatory harmonization, and increasing the future potential of global
governance.
C. The Power of States to Respond
Based on the perspective that the WTO did make a sound decision that
moves towards the future formation of global governance, states do still have some
opportunities to implement regulatory changes according to their specific cultures
and norms. The U.S. government and biotechnology industry have heralded the
decision to lift the EU’s de facto ban and promote the free trade of GM foods. The
decision clears trade barriers and creates more opportunities for GM food research,
development, and production. As U.S. Ambassador Peter Allgeier stated, “the
findings of the panel uphold the principle of science-based policymaking over
unjustified, anti-biotech policies.”50 The United States strongly supports large and
powerful corporations, such as Monsanto, DuPont, and Dow Chemical.51 The
United States does not favor having stricter restrictions and regulations, but seeks to
promote the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s funding for biotechnology research
and development.52
In the EU, new regulations call upon the European Food Safety
Authority to justify GM food permit applications and take more diverse GM
products into consideration.53 No longer can the EU implement what some have
called economic protectionism, because the entities that resisted GM crops were
those who “had an interest in preserving access to non-GM agricultural
markets.”54 The EFSA closely monitors GM foods for effects on heath and the
environment, and assesses the scientific quality of each food application. After
passing the EFSA’s risk assessment, the GM product must be approved by the
European Commission and the majority of member states.55 Strict labeling and
traceability requirements maintain segregation at all stages of production,

50

Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 33, at 803.
Falkner, supra note 25, at 104.
52
See Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 33, at 812.
53
Id. at 809-10.
54
Falkner, supra note 25, at 104.
55
Sheldon, supra note 48, at 124.
51

86

Journal of Legal Studies in Business

[Vol. 15

shipping, processing, and storage.56 The EU has increased transparency and sped
up the approval process, while still maintaining stringent food safety and security;
it has not conformed its regulatory system to adhere to all of the U.S.
biotechnology industry’s interests. Because the laissez-faire approach of the
United States is not spreading to the European Union, states still have the right to
maintain some of their own regulatory processes, showing that perhaps a
sustainable level of international harmonization can occur without the complete
convergence of all state regulations.

IV.

DECREASED ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IMPEDES STATE
SOVEREIGNTY

An exclusively pro-trade stance fails to adequately take into account
competing interests such as public safety and the common good. In this sense,
globalization removes from the citizens more direct control over their inalienable
rights and cultural identities. From this contrasting view, the article will next
examine the declining authority of states, the weakening of international agreements
and precedents, the influences of multiple actors on state sovereignty, and the
cultural differences that hinder global governance.
A. The Declining Authority of States
As discussed previously, the WTO has the ability to supersede its member
states’ national laws and policies to support free trade.57 Rather than increasing the
future potential of global governance, the WTO’s decision “threatens internal
governance processes and impacts national sovereignty”58 because governments have
lost control over core responsibilities to protect domestic health, food safety, and the
environment. There is asymmetry in the current system because, while food laws are
geographic and reflect nation-state values, the economy is global and the WTO has
the authority to regulate trade. States who are members of the WTO will now be
compelled to alter their decision making processes on importing GM products. In
the EU, harmonization of laws is already difficult to achieve, because member states
have to conform their laws to a single standard, thus balancing the autonomy of
member states and consistency of laws.59 GM food donated to African countries as
aid has also taken away from governmental control, because “shipments were often
56
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in contravention of the national regulations of the recipient country.”60
As the primary international organization in the area of food and
agriculture, the FAO has supported a cautious approach that legitimizes the role of
member states in controlling the safety of their food supply. This policy is evidenced
by its statement that:
FAO is constantly striving to determine the potential benefits and
possible risks associated with the application of modern
technologies to increase plant and animal productivity and
production. However, the responsibility for formulating policies
towards these technologies rests with the Member Governments
themselves.61
An expansion of the WTO’s decision “could prevent national and local governments
from setting their own environmental and human health regulations in cases where
scientific uncertainty exists.”62 In this respect, “governments have been left with
responsibility without power,” and states have less control over “the levers of
economic management.”63
According to Robert Gilpin’s definition of economic nationalism,
“economic activities are and should be subordinate to the interests of the state.”64
However, the WTO’s decision clearly favors the biotechnology industry over states,
and the ruling could “be used to pressure governments to force their markets and
fields open to agricultural biotechnology.”65 There is resistance to the WTO’s
rejection of the precautionary principle and the ability of states to safeguard their
domestic food supply under the SPS Agreement as international standards, clearly
showing the “clash between the integrating forces of the world economy and the
centrifugal forces of the sovereign state.”66 There has even been criticism that the
standards determined by the Codex Commission give preferentiality to supporting
trade and biotechnology, over protecting consumer interests and safety.67
Additionally, because civil society is fragmented and there are different cultural
perspectives on GM foods not taken into account by the WTO’s decision, it will be
difficult in the long run to reach one global regulatory standard.68
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B. Weakened International Agreements and Precedents
The WTO’s free trade stance on GM foods goes against previously
established international treaties and standards, such as the precautionary principle
and the Cartagena Protocol.69 Although the United States does not follow these
policies, many countries in Europe, Latin America, and Asia have adopted them.70
By undermining these established international agreements and committees, the
WTO’s decision has detracted from state sovereignty while at the same time stepping
away from universally accepted forms of global agreements.
In 2003, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety became a key international
agreement on preventative measures and GM foods.71 The treaty “obliges exporters
to provide information on internationally traded GMOs and to seek the prior
approval of importing countries.”72 The precautionary principle has been both soft
law common practices and legitimate hard law, such as reflected in the Cartagena
Protocol. The EU applied the precautionary principle to GMOs, with the result that
for technology with scientific risks and uncertainty, the burden of proof of safety
falls onto the technology developer, considering the new technology harmful until
proven safe.73 The United States holds the opposite viewpoint, that new GM
products are assumed to be safe until proven harmful.74 The U.S. perspective is that
the precautionary principle is simply an approach or soft law, rather than
international hard law, and the United States did not sign the Protocol.75 When the
United States filed its case against the EU, essentially this “was sending a message to
developing countries not to use their rights under the Biosafety Protocol, the first
legally binding international agreement that affirms the sovereign right of countries
to reject or ban GMOs on the basis of the precautionary principle.”76
In rejecting the EC’s argument that it take into consideration the rules of
environmental international law, the WTO narrowly interpreted the Vienna
Convention to exclude these multilateral environmental treaties as irrelevant to its
decision on GM foods.77 Under its reasoning, these environmental treaties “need
69
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only be taken into account in the improbable situation where all members of the
WTO have ratified that particular agreement.”78 Critics have observed that “[t]o
avoid such fragmentation of treaties in international law, a wiser approach would be
to embrace the international instruments that have set out to address specific
environmental areas and have evidenced such widespread support.”79
The WTO’s resolution against the Cartagena Protocol and the precautionary
principle as international agreements on environmental and food governance could
weaken the legitimacy of these agreements and further remove authority from states
that are more hesitant towards accepting GM foods without heavy regulations.
Overall, favoring a laissez-faire, free market approach weakens the ability for states
to use the precautionary approach to meet domestic health and environmental
objectives.
C. The Influences of Multiple Actors on State Sovereignty
In addition to the decreased authority of states and the lack of legitimacy for
the precautionary principle and Cartagena Protocol, states have also lost sovereignty
because of the fragmentation of civil society. According to Paul Argenti,
“Multinational corporations and NGOs now have control of much of the agenda
formerly dictated by governments.”80 There are multiple actors participating in the
GM food debate, such as international organizations, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and transnational corporations (TNCs). As Robert Falkner
writes:
It points to the growing influence of nonstate actors, and campaign
groups in particular, in world politics; the ability of environmental
concerns and consumer values to shape global markets; and the
limits of U.S. power in defining the emerging global governance
architecture for environment and food safety.81
NGOs have taken a strong stance on this issue by speaking out against the
WTO’s authority to legislate on environmental and food issues. The reactions of the
NGOs demonstrate the weakened legitimacy and future credibility of the WTO.
NGOs believe that “the WTO is a trade body with no expertise on the
environment.”82 Prior to the release of the WTO’s decision, fifteen public interest
groups from four continents released an amicus curiae brief to articulate that the
interpreting a given treaty.”
78
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“impatience of biotech companies and WTO rules should not be allowed to overrule
the legitimate right of countries to make their own decisions about the safety of GM
products.”83 The brief sided with the EU’s precautionary approach and the risks of
scientific uncertainty. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and other environmental
groups clearly believe that there should be restrictions on GMOs to protect people
and the environment, and that governments should not be coerced into accepting GM
foods.84 After the WTO released its decision, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth
joined the international “Bite Back: WTO Hands Off Our Food!” campaign, a
coalition calling for the right of farmers, consumers, governments, and the Cartagena
Protocol, rather than the WTO, to make food safety decisions.85 These groups have
argued that the ruling is “a major step back for the democratic rights of national and
local governments to set their own environmental and health regulations when there
is scientific uncertainty.”86
Transnational corporations and industry associations, such as the Council of
Biotechnology Information, Biotechnology Industry Organization, and CropLife
International, are key political actors that remove authority and power from states.87
Biotechnology firms actively interact with governments to shape the national
regulations of GMOs and ensure their preferences are taken into account.88 TNCs
can sponsor joint research activities and crop trials with governments, such as in
2001 when Monsanto teamed up with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute to
test the resistance of GM sweet potatoes to insects.89 Even the U.S. Department of
Agriculture has partnered with biotechnology companies to develop the highly
controversial “Terminator” technology, genetically engineered sterile seeds that have
been banned by the United Nations (U.N.) as potentially hazardous to the future of
the global food supply.90 In order to increase GM exports, TNCs have created
alliances with governmental agencies and try to promote GM foods in the context of
key governmental goals, such as the reduction of poverty. At the core, biotech
companies can tailor their arguments on the benefits of GM foods to resonate with
policymakers and favorably influence states’ decisions.
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D. Cultural Differences Hinder Global Governance
Another critical argument that supports allowing each state to regulate its
own policy on GM foods, rather than be subject to the WTO’s decisions in this
sensitive area, points to the different cultural perspectives on genetic engineering
technology. These differences are manifested in the people’s trust of the
government, their appetites for risk given scientific uncertainty, and their views on
food safety. According to this perspective, “the WTO fails to adequately account for
culture values and therefore will have difficulty implementing the decision.”91
Because the WTO’s decision on the trade of GM foods does not account for the
essential cultural differences between states, perhaps GM foods should be only
regulated on a nation-by-nation basis.
In the United States, people have more faith in the government, trust its
regulatory agencies, and generally support biotech companies.92 Unless there are
more severe food scares in the future, the FDA will most likely continue to classify
GM foods as “substantially equivalent” to non-GM foods.93 The National Research
Council has even criticized the U.S. Department of Agriculture for not requiring
inspections of the field-test experiments for GM crops and for being unaware of the
testing that was taking place.94 Positive consumer attitudes towards GM foods are
also prevalent in Canada and Argentina, the next two largest producers of GM foods,
and these countries accordingly lack traceability and labeling requirements.
Consumers in the EU are more risk adverse and demand stringent laws to
protect their health and safety. An EU poll in 2006 determined that more than half of
European consumers considered genetically engineered foods to be dangerous.95
Additionally, EU consumers have more distrust for corporations and agencies in
adequately determining food policy because of historical food scares, such as the
outbreak of mad cow disease in the 1990s.96 These consumers favor NGOs over the
91
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biotechnology industry, and believe in the potential dangers of GM foods rather than
the potential benefits.97 Consequently, the EU’s de facto ban on GM foods could be
interpreted as a reaction to consumer sentiment, political pressures, and the common
belief in the precautionary principle. The European attitude towards food also differs
from that of Americans, because Europeans view food as more of an expression of
unique cultures, nationalities, and regions.98 Europeans strive to keep their historical
cultures, rather than giving in to globalization and “McDonaldization.”99 African
countries are likewise resistant to accept GM foods because GMOs are contrary to
their traditional farming methods and could potentially harm ecosystems. Farmers
in these countries do not want to become overly reliant on the U.S. biotech industry
or be exposed to new risks.
The WTO trade dispute on GMOs could potentially reflect “U.S.
unilateralism in biosafety politics”100 because the U.S. biotech firms have attempted
to change the cultures in other countries and the U.S. government has supported the
interests of the biotech industry. An example of the cultural misunderstanding can
be seen when in the mid-1990s, Monsanto launched a $5 million advertising
campaign to support biotech products in Europe, without fully realizing that the
consumers’ perspective was not anti-scientific or irrational, but merely a reflection of
cultural views towards food safety and environmental issues.101 The WTO’s decision
undermines the authority of states to best serve the interests of their citizens, and
clearly supports the U.S. dominance in policymaking and economics. The EU is
caught between pressure from its citizens to highly regulate and even ban GM foods,
and pressure from the WTO and transnational corporations not to impose stringent
regulations.
Because the WTO is focused only upon markets and free trade, it does not
take into consideration crucial societal values or cultural preferences.102 Cultural
differences make it more difficult to form international policies on GM foods that
can eventually lead to a new form of global governance. Because of these cultural
differences, it is “unrealistic to expect a fully harmonized global standard for
biosafety regulation.”103 Perhaps overcoming these cultural differences and reaching
a global consensus will only occur in the event of an extreme crisis that either
necessitates the use of GM foods to reduce poverty and malnourishment, or exposes
GM foods as scientifically harmful to health, safety, and the environment.
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CONCLUSION

As globalization impacts food regulations, the potential problems include
the obscuring of national identities, the diminishing of state autonomies, and the
favoring of agribusiness over consumer safety in the international regulations that
result.104 This is certainly the case with the WTO’s decision on GM foods that
supports free trade, global markets, and biotechnology companies over cultural
values, international agreements, and local traditional producers. The WTO’s
decision stands in opposition to the preferences of consumer groups, NGOs, and
certain governments, so that global regulations propagate at the expense of state
sovereignty and control. Essentially, “the world community denounces the fact that
this trade organization, which has no authority to legislate, is making decisions in the
context of a trade dispute between a few parties on the future of the food supply of
all.”105 The WTO places economic considerations ahead of concerns for health,
science, safety, and the environment. Its excessive support of the U.S. and biotech
companies’ unilateral perspectives will weaken the WTO’s future credibility and
legitimacy, further complicating the enforceability of its rulings. By making
judgments and decisions on the validity of health and environmental issues, the
WTO legislated beyond its regulatory scope of international trade.
In addition, the WTO weakened the application of the SPS Agreement,
Cartagena Protocol, and precautionary principle to the international trade of GMOs
by favoring risk assessment practices over recognition of some scientific
uncertainty.106 The decision undermines strong, well-established international
consensuses. Moreover, the ruling could set a precedent against state regulations
that are in accordance with multilateral environmental agreements.107 These
detrimental changes may prove to be a step back in international policymaking, the
establishment of global governance and regulatory standards, as well as the future of
multilateral environmental and trade agreements.
The WTO could have forged a path in its decision more by way of a
compromise that would be sustainable in the long run. Mandatory labeling and
traceability requirements of genetically modified ingredients could be such a
solution, even though multinational corporations would bear most of the labeling
costs. Mandating labeling of internationally traded GM foods would help address
cultural differences and risk factors, while still allowing free trade and economic
markets to control the process. The Codex, FAO, and WHO could work together to
establish these labeling guidelines that would serve as a risk management tool and
provide consumers with more information on the presence of GM ingredients and
104
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warnings about potential allergens.108 If the collaboration of already established
international organizations is not sufficient, perhaps a new regulatory body could be
established in the future to incorporate both the economic and scientific aspects of
GMOs into its policies.109
Although this article focuses upon GM foods, the issue of international
regulations extends beyond food markets and raises the broader question of whether
international laws and institutions should supersede state regulations to manage
global trade and investment. The international political economy has already been
significantly transformed by globalization and technological advances such as
genetic engineering. In the future, the move towards more global governance and
transnational agreements will by necessity serve to compromise the power of states.
However, it will be difficult to reach a universal consensus on issues such as
genetically modified foods that involve economic, scientific, political, cultural,
environmental, and health issues. Policymakers should query whether the outcome
would indeed further the ultimate goals of the safety and sustainability of the global
food supply.
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